We present a three-player game in which a decision-maker, in the role of referee, accepts or rejects the offer made by a proposer to a passive receiver. If the offer is accepted, the split takes place as suggested, if rejected both proposer and passive receiver get $0. The payoff of the decision-maker, on the other hand, will be the treatment variable. Our results show a decision-maker that ignores his payoffs, but that is so concerned about equality among other players that rejects both selfish and generous offers. Furthermore, when we introduce a cost to rejecting proposals, not only do we continue to observe generous offers being rejected, but we are able to show that inequality aversion is the only reason behind rejections, completely taking over any of the decision-maker's concerns over the selfish intentions of the proposer. JEL: C92, D71, D63, D31
Introduction
The literature on other regarding preferences has come up with many reasons to explain the counterintuitive rejections observed in ultimatum games 1 , yet no experiment has ever tried to observe the preferences of a neutral third party with no stakes in the game to see what are the "primal" reasons behind these rejections. Using a novel three-player ultimatum game structure that separates the decision-maker's choices from his final payoffs, we are able to map the decision-makers neutral preferences over the whole span of possible splits in the game.
The results show a decision-maker that ignores his relative payoffs when making decisions, but that is very concerned about the equality of splits between the two other players. In fact, this concern is so deep that rejections are of both selfish and generous 2 offers. Finally, we report that while decisionmakers show some worries over the selfish behavior of proposers, once we introduce a cost to rejecting offers, these worries disappear completely, with rejections being driven only by inequality concerns.
The main contributions of this paper are, thus, the design of a game where the decision-maker has no strategic or monetary concerns, the mapping of the preferences of this "alienated" decision-maker (which frequently rejects generous proposals), and finally showing that selfish intentions of proposers are hardly of second order of importance to decision-makers.
Literature Review
Three-player ultimatum games have been largely studied, being responsible for some key insights in the much written about ultimatum game literature. In Knez and Camerer (1995) , a proposer makes a simultaneous offer to two independent responders who can accept or reject proposals conditional on the offer made to the other receiver. The results show that receivers accept offers depending on their relative standing to the third participant, that is, responders are not willing to get offered less than their counterpart. In Güth and Van Damme (1998) , a proposer splits the pie with a decision-maker and a passive "dummy" player who plays no role in the game; if the offer is accepted by the decision-maker, then the split goes as suggested, if rejected, then everyone receives zero. The result is that both proposer and responder end up ignoring the presence of the dummy player and split the pie between themselves. Finally, Kagel & Wolfe (2001) present us with a setup identical to Güth and Van Damme (1998) except that now, if the offer is rejected, the dummy player gets a consolation prize. As in Güth and Van Damme (1998) , but against inequality aversion theories, the dummy seems to play no role for decision-makers even when he gets a high consolation prize.
Another strand of literature that has a bearing in our experiment is third-party punishment. Fehr et al. (2005) report that third-party sanctions are not used to reduce inequality, but rather as retaliation for selfish actions. Yet, Leibbrandt and Lopez-Perez (2008) use a within-subject design to conclude that both second and third party punishments are driven by outcomes not intentions. Interestingly, and against Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) , Leibbrandt and Lopez-Perez (2008) find that second-party punishment is not significantly higher than third-party punishment. More recently, Falk et al. (2008) have revisited the subject suggesting that while inequality has some effect on punishment, intentions are the main reason behind most punitive actions. Our conclusions are in stark contrast with this latter result.
While we are not the first to report rejections of generous offers, we are the first to do so in a lab experiment (previous reports where field experiments). Furthermore, these previous results had always been dismissed as an anomaly. For example, Bahry and Wilson (2005) report an "inverted-U" pattern 3 when comparing ultimatum game results across old Soviet Union regions, but they dismiss it as a result of Soviet education. The second paper in which the inverted-U pattern is mentioned is Güth et al. (2007) , in which the authors gathered ultimatum game data through newspaper publications. In this case the results are not reported, but only informally mentioned due to the insignificant number of observations.
Finally, there has been some controversy about the validity of the strategy method, a technique which we use in our experiment. Brandts and Charness (2011) is a good survey on the subject and supports the use of the strategy method. In fact, if we had used a direct method instead of the strategy method, the inverted-U results might have been even more prominent as Brandts and Charness (2011) report that punishment rates are lower if the strategy method is used. Further, Brandts and Charness (2011) claim that "in no case do we find that a treatment effect found with the strategy method is not observed in the direct-response method". See also Brandts and Charness (2003) for more information on the matter.
Experimental Design
The experiment has two different game structures. The first one is a three-player ultimatum game (3UG) which is at the center of the paper, the second a two-player ultimatum game (2UG) which we use to show that decision-makers take seriously the possibility of generous offers being made.
3UG
The three-player ultimatum game (3UG) has a proposer (A) making an offer to a dummy player (C) on how to split $10. Meanwhile, the decision-makers (B), without knowing the actual proposal, fills a strategy profile (Figure 1 ) accepting or rejecting all potential offers from A to C. If the offer is accepted, then the split goes as suggested by A; if rejected, then both A and C get nothing for the round. B's payoffs are our treatment variables, which we divide into two families. The first one is the "costlessrejection" family and has 3 treatments:
 Low (L): B gets paid $3 for his decisions, whatever the outcome of the game.
 Normal (N): B gets paid $5 for his decisions, whatever the outcome of the game.
 High (H): B gets paid $12 for his decisions, whatever the outcome of the game.
The reason for having three treatments is to test if the decision-maker is payoff "neutral" or whether his relative payments affects his choices. For example; rejections of generous offers could be justified by a need to prevent anyone from getting a higher payoff than the receiver (i. e., rejecting because of disadvantageous inequality). If that were the case, then we should not observe rejections of generous offers in the H treatment (or at least significantly less than in the L treatment). On the other hand, if rejection patterns are not significantly different across treatments, then it means that decision-makers do not take into account their payoffs when making decision. This would imply that the results of the 3UG game are the decision-makers "pure" set of preferences over the splits of A and C; Not only does the decision-maker not have any strategic concerns in the game, but he is not driven by his relative monetary standing, just his pure set of preferences. The second group of treatments will be what we call the "costly-rejection" family and its purpose is to test the robustness of our findings in the first family. The "costly-rejection" family has two treatments: 
2UG
In the 2UG game, we keep the 3-player group design, but now A makes two independent offers on how to split $10; one offer to B, the other to C. As in the 3UG case, we will use the strategy method to elicit B and C's preferences over offers made to them. So, if B (C) rejects the offer that A made to him, then B (C) gets $0 for the round. If, instead B (C) accepts the offer, then the split goes as suggested by A. A's payoff is randomly chosen from one of the two different outcomes; if the selected game turns out to be a rejection, then A gets $0 for the round, if an acceptance, then A gets his part of the proposal. The purpose of the randomization of payoffs is to prevent portfolio effects, and to make payoffs fairer across subject types.
The 2UG game was designed to verify if decision-makers took seriously the possibility of "hypergenerous" offers, and to validate our subject pool. The results of this game will be crucial to justify the credibility of some of our most interesting 3UG results.
Implementation
The experiment was run with a total of 237 undergraduates from both the Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( . Subjects were recruited through the ORSEE systems of each university, and were required not to have any previous experience in bargaining games. In total 15 sessions were run, UCSC sessions had 12 subjects 6 and UPF sessions 18 subjects 7 .
As subjects arrived to the lab, they were seated randomly in front of a terminal and the initial instructions were read aloud. In these instructions we announced that:
1) The experiment would have three rounds. 2) Instructions for each round would be read immediately before each round started 8 .
3) Each subject would be assigned a player type (A, B or C) which they would keep through the experiment. 4) Each round, subjects would be randomly assigned to a different group 9 of three players (one of each type). 5) Only one of the rounds, randomly chosen by the computer, would be chosen for the final payoffs. 6) No feedback would be given until the end of the session 10 , when they would be informed of the actions of subjects in their group for each round, as well as the round selected for the final payoffs.
Each session was composed of two 3UG treatments and one 2UG 11 .
Results

2UG Game
We summarize all of B subject's observations in Figure 3 . In it we present the percentage of decisionmakers accepting each potential offer from A to C (e.g. almost 60% of B subjects accept a hypothetical offer of $3 while only 30% accept one of $1). The acceptance results are slightly higher than those reported in the literature (Camerer and Thaler (1995) ), but still within the range of what would be expected. The average offer was of $3.59, which is also what would be expected in an experiment like this.
These results validate both our subject pool and the software interface, but most importantly, they show that decision-makers act consistently 12 when deciding about hyper-generous offers (i.e., subjects do not randomize or "experiment" within this range of offers). We take this as an indication that decision-makers take seriously the possibility of a generous offer. Two things stand out immediately from these graphs. First, decision-makers reject both generous and selfish offers. In fact, if an offer is generous
13
, the more generous it is, the less likely that it will be accepted. It is this pattern of behavior that gives us the inverted-U shape that Bahry and Wilson (2005) first identified in their field experiments. The second striking feature is that all treatments seem to have identical effects, whether we pay $3 or $12 to the decision maker, the behavior is the same. In fact, if we run a Two-sided Fisher test comparing the aggregated number of acceptances for each potential offer, we find no statistically significant differences across treatments (Table 1) . 12 Three subjects that rejected offers of $8 or more yet accepted all smaller offers. We believe that these subjects misunderstood the interface and were trying to reject offers smaller than $2.
13 As defined at the beginning of the experiment (i.e. greater than $5). Further, if we use a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test to compare the number of accepted offers in each treatments a subject has participated in, then we see that the number of accepted offers is not statistically different between the N and L treatments (p = 0.375) nor among the N and H (p = 0.161) 14 .
Figure 4: Acceptance rate histograms for all three costless rejection treatments, with pairwise comparisons
Finally, we run a regression of total accepted offers (Total) on dummies for location (Where), order (First), and treatment (High and Low). The results are shown in Table 2 , in the first two columns we compare H directly to L, in the third and fourth we compare High and Low to the baseline N. The results show that payoffs and ordering 15 have no effect on the number of accepted offers, and neither does location (all of these results are later confirmed in Table 3 ).
Therefore, in the costless-rejection family, decision-makers appear not to take their own payoff as a reference when making decisions. It seems that in our three-player game structure, decision-makers assign to themselves the "dummy" position that Kagel and Wolfe (2001) and Güth and Van Damme (1998) had previously reported in three player ultimatum games. This is an important result, as it shows that the inverted-U pattern is truly a mapping of preferences from a decision-maker only concerned about the splits between A and C and not his own payoffs.
14 On the other hand, the test becomes somewhat more significant when comparing L and H (p = 0.0825), probably because the number of subjects participating in both H and L is extremely low (n = 4). See appendix B for a lengthier discussion on this question. 15 Column 2 shows some minimal order effects. We attribute these to the lack of first round H treatment observations. See Appendix B. To better analyze the results of the 3UG game we define "absolute inequality" as the absolute value of the difference between A and C's payoff, and label all offers to the left of $5 as the Left-Hand-Tail (LHT), and all offers to the right of $5 as the Right-Hand-Tail (RHT).
We then run a Spearman rank correlation test (Appendix C) and show that as we move away from the even split (i.e. when absolute inequality increases), acceptance rates decrease in both directions (i.e. both in the RHT and the LHT). To have a more accurate idea of how absolute inequality affects the probability of rejection, we run a linear probability model 16 (Table 3 ). In it, the binary accept/reject outcome is the dependent variable and we have dummies for ordering (First), treatment (High, Low), location (Where), as well as dummies for distance that are coded with both distance to the even split and tail (Left or Right) they are located in. For example, dist3l is the dummy for the $2 offer (which is 3 dollars to the left of $5) and dist2r is the dummy for an offer of $7 (which is 2 dollars to the right of $5).
Column 5 of Table 3 has the full specification of the regression and shows that all dummies for distance are not only negative, but also highly significant. Moreover, if we look at the coefficients for the distance dummies, the further away an offer is from $5 the lower is its probability of being accepted; the higher absolute inequality, the lower the probability of being accepted. This relationship is monotonic in both tails 17 , ranging from an 8% lower probability of acceptance for an offer of $6 (dist1r) to a 33.3% lower probability of acceptance for an offer of $10 (dist5r)! On the other hand, from Figure 4 we can see that the inverted-U does not seem totally symmetric as for the same level of inequality LHT seem to be less likely of being accepted. After all, in Table 3 , the dummy for an offer of $3 (absolute inequality = 4) has a coefficient of -0.44, while an offer of $7 (with same absolute inequality) has a coefficient of -0.19. We attribute this to the concern for intentions of the decision-maker, as he seems more tolerant of inequality if this is the result of a generous offer.
To check if intentions are significant, we run a linear probability model for each individual treatment, and compare the coefficients of those offers with same absolute inequality through a Wald Test (Table  4 ). The result shows that the tails are asymmetric, that is; for same absolute inequality, the coefficients are significantly different. 
Result 3: In the costless-rejection family, decision-makers are less willing to tolerate inequality when this is the result of a selfish offer.
The three results presented above offer a picture of a decision-maker unconcerned about his own payoff, yet showing such inequality aversion that he is willing to leave both A and C with a $0 payoff 18 rather than accepting an unequal offer…even if it is a generous one! In fact, if an offer is generous (i.e. in the RHT), then, the more generous it is the less likely it is to be accepted. Result 3 on the other hand shows that inequality aversion is not the only reason behind the inverted-U pattern that we observe, as for the same level of absolute inequality those offers in the RHT are more likely to be accepted than those in the LHT. We interpret this as intentions playing a role, but behind stronger inequality concerns. Since the outcomes of our first batch of experiments were so striking, we decided to design a new family of treatments in which the decision-maker has to pay $1 if the game ends in a rejection. We label this the "costly-rejection" family, and it has two treatments, H-1 and L-1. In the first (second) one the decision-makers is paid $12 ($3) if the outcome is an acceptance and $11 ($2) if it's a rejection. The purpose of this new family is to test whether decision-makers are still willing to reject generous offers when a cost is introduced. In particular, we are interested in whether decision-makers continue to ignore their payoffs (and act similarly) even when the costs to rejecting are so different. Notice that in both treatments the cost of rejecting is the same ($1), but in the L-1 case this represents 1/3 of the payoff, while in H-1 it is only 1/12 of the payoff.
Costly Rejection
In Figure 5 we present the results of the costly-rejection treatments and compare them to their costlessrejection counterpart, and the N baseline. The most striking feature is that we still observe rejections on both tails 19 under costly treatments; the inverted-U pattern of acceptances is still there even under the "costly-rejection" family. As we can see in Table 6 , a linear probability model with dummies for distance to the fair split continues to show a monotonic negative correlation between inequality and probability of acceptance in both tails. So, decision-makers continue to reject both selfish and hyper-fair offers even when these have a high cost (L-1). As in the costless treatment we run a Wilcoxon matched-pairs sign-rank test comparing the number of offers that each subject accepts in each treatment she participated in, finding no statistically significant difference (p = 0.6172). Additionally, both the linear probability model of Table 6 and a Two-sided Fisher test, confirm that there exists no significant difference between treatments (Appendix D).
Result 4: In the costly-rejection family of treatments, decision-makers do not take their own payoffs as a reference when making decisions.
Where we do see a difference is between both families; if we run a regression on total accepted offers comparing H to H-1 and L to L-1. The tests show a significant difference across treatment dummies (p= 0.002 and p = 0.000 respectively).
To be more precise about where the treatments differ we run a One-sided Fisher test and observe that the differences are mostly in the LHT (Table 7) . As we can see from both Table 7 and Figure 5 , it looks like once we introduce a cost to rejecting offers, concerns over the selfish proposals seem to fade away and only absolute inequality is driving rejection. In order to prove that concerns for selfishness disappear once we introduce a $1 penalty to rejecting, we compare both tails of the acceptance distribution. Running a linear probability model for each treatment in the family we compare the coefficients for those dummies with the same level of absolute inequality through a Wald test. The results show a symmetric L-1, but a slightly unbalanced H-1 (Table 7) . On the other hand, a Two-sided Fisher test shows both treatments as symmetric (Table 8) .
We consider these results to be a direct result of the weight that decision-makers put into the intentions of proposers; even the smallest cost (1/12 of the total payoff) has such an effect that the inverted-U pattern is almost perfectly symmetric as inequality aversion still persists as the main driver bhind rejections. We introduced the costly-rejection family to see if decision-makers still would reject generous offers even if this entailed a cost. The results show that not only does the decision-maker continue to reject offers in this family of treatments, but that he behaves the same across family treatments even under very asymmetric payoffs. But the surprise comes from the tail where decision-makers decide to stop rejecting; it is not on the RHT, but rather in the LHT. It turns out that when a cost to reject is introduced in the 3UG game decision-makers stop putting an important weight to intentions and only reject offers based on absolute inequality. So, when we introduce a cost to rejecting offers not only is the inverted-U form still there, but now it is symmetric!
Conclusions
We design a three-player ultimatum game where a third party accepts or rejects all potential offers on how to split $10 between two other subjects. If the offer is accepted, then the split goes as suggested; if rejected, then both proposer and receiver get $0. The decision-maker payoff is our treatment variable. The first result of the experiment shows that in our experiment the decision-maker is completely detached form the game and does not care about his relative payoff when making decisions. This means that any result presented under our game structure is a mapping of the "primal" preferences of a decision-maker, the decisions of someone whose only concern is split between A and C. This is a new result in the social-preferences experiments, which we consider can be very useful not only in the social preferences literature, but also to other areas of research such as experiments involving arbitration or conflict resolution.
Our second significant result is shows that decision-makers are so concerned with inequality that a significant number of generous offers are rejected. In fact, this phenomenon is so extreme that the results takes the form of an inverted-U pattern of acceptances; a shape that to our knowledge had never been observed in any lab experiment before. Furthermore, when we introduce a cost to rejecting offers, not only do we still observe rejections of generous offers, but we find that the inverted-U shape is now symmetric. This symmetry comes from decision-maker rejecting generous and selfish offers in identical proportions. We use then use this symmetry to show that for the decision-maker concerns over the selfish intentions of the proposer are clearly of second order of importance when compared to concerns over absolute inequality.
All in all, the results presented here seem to revive inequality aversion as the main behavioral driver around other regarding preferences. The fact that still now we were able to present surprising results on social preferences experiments means that experimental economics is still far from understanding how subjects behave in social environments. Clearly, (10 years later) more research funding is needed
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. 20 See page 851 from Charness and Rabin (2002) .
Number of Subjects Participating in Each Type of Session
In the next While most treatments have no ordering effects, the LHT of the H treatment seems to be significantly affected by ordering. If we look at Graph A, we can see that while last round pattern of acceptances does look like those in the rest of treatments, first round H acceptances looks pretty random. As mentioned, we believe that this is due to the low number of observations of H in the first round, and that if we had more observations we would see no ordering effects.
Instructions:
3UG:
Welcome! This is an economics experiment. You will be a player in many periods of an interactive decision-making game. If you pay close attention to these instructions, you can earn a significant sum of money. It will be paid to you in cash at the end of the last period.
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people's work. If you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and we will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation today.
What's this all about:
This experiment has three different rounds. Before each round the specific rules and how you will earn money will be explained to you.
In each round there will always be three types of players: A, B and C. You will be assigned to a type in Round 1 and will remain this type across all three rounds.
Only one of the three rounds will be used for the final payoffs. This round is chosen randomly by the computer.
The outcomes of each round are not made public until the end of the session (i.e. after round 3).
Each round the groups are scrambled so you will never make offers or decide for the same player in two different rounds.
Round 1:
The first thing that you will see on your screen is your player type.
You will then be assigned to a group consisting of three players: an A type, B type and C type.
Player A will be endowed with $10 which he will split with player C. In order to do so Player A will have to input the amount he is willing to offer Player C. Player A will only be able to make integer offers (full dollars), so A will not be able to break its offer into cents.
While player A is deciding how much to offer player C, player B will be filling out a binding "strategy profile". The strategy profile has an "accept or reject" button for each potential offer from A to C (from $0 to $10). Player B's binding decision to accept or reject A's offers to C will be done before he knows the actual offer made by A.
A's decision: How to split an endowment of $10 with Player C by making him an offer between $0 and $10. If the offer is of $X, A will be keeping for himself 10-X.
B's decision: Before knowing the offer from A to C, B will fill a binding "strategy profile" deciding whether he accepts or rejects every potential offer from A to C. This decision is made without knowing the offer from A to C.
It is very important for A to realize that he is going to write the amount he wants to offer C and not how much he wants to keep.  Player A gets $0  Player C gets $0  Player B gets $3
Round 3:
As mentioned at the beginning of the experiment you will remain your player type across the whole session.
This round is very similar to round 1. You will now be re-scrambled into groups of three subjects (one A, one B and one C subject).
A will be endowed with $10 and must decide how to split them with C.
B's role is exactly the same as that in round 1: Before knowing the offer from A to C, B will fill a "strategy profile" deciding whether he accepts or rejects every potential offer from A to C.
If the offer from A to C is accepted by B, then the split is done as proposed by A. If B rejects the offer, then both A and C receive $0 for this round.
B's payoff in this round is a flat $12 fee, whatever his decision and outcome of the round.
So, the only change between Round 1 and Round 3 is that player B, is getting paid a different amount. 
